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BRAZIL AS A LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL UNIT 
I. PHASES OF BRAZILIAN HISTORY 
is almost a truism to  say that  interest in the history of a 
of it as a nation. The dramatic circumstances that  might 
have shaped that  history are of no avail to  make it worth 
knowing; the actual or past standing of the country and its 
people is thus the only practical motive. According to  such 
an interpretation of historical interest, I may say that the 
international importance of Brazil seems to  be growing fast. 
Since the Great War, many books on South America have 
been published in the United States, and abundant references 
t o  Brazil may be found in all of them. Should I have to  
mention any of the recent books, I would certainly not forget 
Herman James's Brazil after a Century,' Jones's South Amer- 
ica,' for the anthropogeographic point of view, Mary Wil- 
liams's People and Politics o j  Latin A r n e r i ~ a , ~  the books of 
Roy Nash, J. F. Normano, J. F. Rippy, Max Winkler, and 
others. 
Considering Brazil as a South American political entity, 
it  is especially the historical point of view that I purpose t o  
interpret. Therefore it may be convenient to  have a pre- 
liminary general view of the story of independent Brazil, 
I' country is in proportion to  the international importance 
'See reference, Lecture V, p. 296. 
IC. F. Jones, South America (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930). 
W a r y  W. Williams, The People and Politics of Latin America (Boston: Ginn & 
CO. ,  1930). 
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emphasizing the characteristic features of the different pe- 
riods. Though usually precise dates are difficult to deter- 
mine for the limitation of historical tendencies or trends, it 
happens that  in Brazilian political evolution they seem to  
work satisfactorily enough. 
I. The first ten years that  followed independence, under 
Dom Pedro I, might be described as the period of political 
adjustment t o  constitutional life. 
2 .  Then the first twenty years, 1831-1850, of the second 
emperor were the phase of internal strife in the provinces. 
3 .  The next twenty years, 1850-1870, belong mostly to  
the history of external intervention in the River Plate affairs. 
4. The last twenty years, 1870-1889, of the reign of Dom 
Pedro 11, involved chiefly questions of social evolution- 
slave liberation and immigration-with a persistent republi- 
can propaganda. 
5. With the republican institutions there is a quarter of a 
century, 1889-1914, of political adaptation and economic 
equipment of the country. 
6. The war-crisis for ten years with presidentship discussed 
and criticized. 
7. The last ten years, 1930-1940, could be labeled: indus- 
trialization and social legislation-with a strong current of 
nationalism. 
During these 120 years of independent life, Brazil, as a 
political unit in our continent, has had her international 
interest of different kinds interpreted by a diplomatic agency 
of remarkable continuity of views, on the whole, and of great 
wisdom and moderation. I do not know whether tolerance 
and mildness are political qualities for a nation; anyway, 
they belong to  the Brazilian people, and history proves that, 
whatever the regime of the country, they were traditionally 
connected with Brazilian foreign policy. 
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Before stating the different problems that have called for 
the attention of republican diplomacy, it is necessary to say 
something about imperial and even colonial tradition. 
11. TRADITIONS I N  BRAZILIAN IMPERIAL DIPLOMACY 
When the Brazilian nation became autonomous, there was 
no need to  organize a new administrative system, to  plan new 
international schemes, t o  train for a new political routine, 
for there had been no breaking up of the past, no swerving 
from established direction. On the contrary-and the fact 
seems unique among newly-formed nationalities-Brazil had 
already a well-organized foreign office with traditional views 
and ways. It was due to  King John VI who, fleeing from 
Portugal in 1807 under the pressure of Napoleonic invasion, 
brought t o  Brazil, the new metropolis of his kingdom, papers, 
archives, officials, civil servants, and officers of one of the 
best-organized cabinets of Europe. Rio de Janeiro became 
thus the heir t o  Lisbon secrets from John I and his English 
wife, Philippa of Lancaster, Luis de Cunha, Alesandre de 
Gusmao, and the Marquis de Pombal. Four centuries of 
European political wisdom were piled in the royal trunks 
that  landed in Brazil at  that  moment. And, as a Brazilian 
historian, Pedro Calmon, expresses it, King John rendered 
two great services t o  us: he endowed the country with a 
complete political apparatus of European make, and when he 
sailed away in 1821 he did not dismantle it. So we learned 
our lesson in European experience, and the Holy Alliance 
held no secrets for our rulers. 
Although there was no discontinuity in Brazilian political 
activities on our continent, it does not imply that there was 
no evolution in the diplomatic system. 
We inherited from the Portuguese system a certain atti- 
tude towards the Spanish American territories. Since 1679, 
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the Portuguese had repeatedly interfered in the River Plate. 
For the first time the Brazilian system had worked in 1750, 
and we had kept away from River Plate entanglements. But 
the European king, under cover of the Holy Alliance spirit, 
t o  uphold legitimacy and royalty against the revolution in 
Buenos Aires, interfered in Uruguay and finally annexed the 
Cisplatina Province. It was a personal triumph for King 
John, notwithstanding British diplomatic opposition. Soon 
after independence, the first emperor lost the heirloom of 
Cisplatina. 
But against the Portuguese system of “imperial expan- 
sion,” our policy turned little by little t o  the Brazilian sys- 
tem of “national consolidation,’’ based on the principle of 
uti possidetis, expressed in the Treaty of Madrid, in 1750, by 
the Brazilian diplomacy of Alesandre de Gusmao. 
The  early relations of the United States with Brazil were not so friendly 
as they have become to-day. A t  the beginning of the nineteeth century 
privateering was unquestionably a profitable source of income to  many 
American ship-owners. Baltimore’s reputation as a rendezvous of pri- 
vateers became so notorious tha t  a t  the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in 
1818 the Portuguese government submitted a memorial on the subject, 
and the powers agreed t o  take up the question in a friendly fashion with 
the United States. Undoubtedly Brazil was back of the Portuguese pro- 
test, because i t  was Brazil tha t  had suffered particularly through this 
practice. T h e  Banda Oriental, now the Republic of Uruguay, had been 
seized by the Portuguese in 1816 from Artigas and his Argentinian forces. 
Artigas, however, could not afford to  lose Montevideo; hence he engaged 
a number of privateers to  prey upon Portuguese commerce. T h e  Abbe^ 
Correa, the Portuguese minister to  the United States, asserted tha t  the 
greater part of these privateers were fitted out  and manned in the ports 
of the  United States. Adams conceded not only tha t  this abomination 
had spread over a large portion of the merchants and population of Balti- 
more, but  tha t  it had infected almost every officer of the  United States in 
the place.. . . Fortunately, by 1820 the power of Artigas was completely 
br0ken.l 
This was a blessing for peace and security as evidenced in 
‘Graham H. Stuart, Latin America and the United States (New York: The Century 
Co., 1928), p. 420. 
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the Treaty of 1828. In  exchange we were able to  compel 
River Plate governments to acknowledge the independence 
of Uruguay and our true southern boundaries. 
Our reactionary attitude towards revolutionary explosions 
in Pernambuco in 1824 was duly appreciated by European 
monarchies of the Metternich system, but in America it was 
not approved in the same way. James Monroe is said to  
have expressed t o  the Argentinian Carlos Alvear his opinion 
that :  the Brazilian government has close relations with 
European sovereigns but their relations with the new Amer- 
ican nations are of mere courtesy, and undermined. On the 
other hand, Bolivar is supposed to  have seriously planned a 
“destruction of the Empire” as stated in a letter from 
Dorrego t o  Lavalleja. As to  our young emperor, while he 
had rather contradictory views on liberalism, his American- 
ism on the whole was of a constructive nature. The last 
scheme of Dom Pedro I was revealed, years later, to Manuel 
Moreno by the Foreign Ofice: Santo Amaro, his representa- 
tive in London in 1830 had been instructed to  discuss the 
possibility of enthroning European princes of royal blood in 
South American capitals. In  1831, however, he was com- 
pelled to  abdicate himself. Curiously enough, his son, Pedro 
11, was not interested in the strange adventure of his cousin, 
Maximilian of Mexico, thirty years later. 
The twenty years’ period of the regency during Dom 
Pedro 11’s minority and the first years of his reign was 
one of internal strife and turbulence in the River Plate 
provinces. 
Soon after the accession of the new emperor, local revolu- 
tions had broken out on political grounds in Minas, Siio 
Paulo, Recife, and Rio Grande do Sul. I n  this last province 
the “Farrapos” or “Tramps” war lasted ten years, 1835- 
1845. The gaucho rebels of the south never appealed for 
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foreign support, but the revolution itself was intimately 
connected with the River Plate crises, because of the attitude 
of Argentine and Uruguayan leaders toward the empire. The 
most interesting episode of that  whole period of history in 
Buenos Aires was what has been called the “Age of Rosas,” 
a twenty years’ dictatorship of a so-called federalist caudilho, 
J. Manuel Rosas, whose “lack of a sound, wholesome sense of 
humour,” says Mary Williams, “invited fanatical extremes.” 
For ten solid years, Dom Pedro I1 hesitated t o  interfere 
with River Plate caudilhos. The year 1843 seems to  be the 
turning-point in Brazilian diplomacy; it started the prepara- 
tion of a new system in foreign policy, the intervention period 
that  lasted from 1850 t o  1870. The knotty point of the ques- 
tion was the siege of Montevideo by the commander-in-chief 
of Rosas’ army, the “blanco” caudilho Oribe. The imperial 
government had no special sympathy towards the besieged 
“colorado” caudilho Rivera, who had friends among the 
farrapos” rebels in Brazil. So the first move of imperial 
diplomacy was to  accept an exchange of views with Tomas 
Guido, Rosas’ representative in Rio de Janeiro. Mutual 
support was then considered, but the Brazilian cabinet in- 
sisted on a definite boundary convention with Uruguay and a 
positive acknowledgment of Uruguayan sovereignty. A pre- 
liminary treaty was negotiated, but for unknown reasons 
Rosas rejected it. At that  moment it was all the worse for 
Brazil that  England and France had recognized the blockade 
of Montevideo, and the hostility of Rosas was all the more 
significant. An inversion of attitudes was the result of the 
new Brazilian move in Uruguay and the “South American 
Troy” was victualed by our ships. I n  consequence, peace 
was restored in the Rio Grande by the pacification policy of 
the Duke of Caxias; a Brazilian emissary was sent t o  Presi- 
dent Carlos L6pez of Paraguay; the Marquis of Abrantes was 
< I  
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sent t o  Europe to  persuade Aberdeen and Guizot t o  help 
Rivera in Montevideo. 
At that  time our diplomatic relations with England were 
strained on account of difficulties that  had arisen about the 
enforcement of the Aberdeen Bill on the slave trade. Eng- 
land was opposed t o  Brazilian intervention in the River 
Plate quarrel. At any rate, imperial diplomacy in 1850 suc- 
ceeded in financing the resistance of Montevideo and came 
to an understanding with Urquiza, Rosas’ caudilho in Entre 
Rios. A coalition was thus organized, with Argentinian, 
Uruguayan, and Brazilian elements, so that when the Eng- 
lish cabinet started t o  discuss the case the London Times 
published the intervention news and, a few days later, Rosas 
was defeated a t  Monte Caseros and had t o  leave Buenos 
Aires on a British ship. 
Thus were Argentina and Uruguay restored t o  normal 
representative government and Brazilian intervention ap- 
peared in its true light, pacifying, constructive, liberal, and 
American. 
I n  Uruguayan political life the blanco party had always 
been anti-Brazilian and favored Argentina; the colorado 
party, on the other hand, was favorable to  Brazil. Ten years 
later, in 1864, the complaints of Brazilian landowners in 
Uruguay, cattle breeders, and “rancheros” settled in northern 
departments, compelled the imperial government to  send a 
special agent to Montevideo. This was the Saraiva Mission 
charged with demanding reparation for blanco aggression 
and attacks. In  the meantime the new president of Paraguay, 
dictator Solano Lbpez, gave his underhand support t o  Uru- 
guayan resistance, and the Saraiva Mission failed to  obtain 
reparation. The empire was thus led to back the Uruguayan 
rebels of Venancio Flores and a new war started with the 
blockade of Salto and of Paysand6 by the Brazilian fleet. 
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Montevideo surrendered a t  last and the colorados were 
restored to  office. 
This second war made unavoidable the third conflict: the 
Paraguayan War of five years, a long, cruel, and costly 
struggle. Over IOO,OOO Paraguayan soldiers lost their lives 
t o  uphold tyranny in South America. The Paraguayan dic- 
tator died in the last battle. The Brazilian monarch ex- 
tended t o  the unhappy country his protection and gener- 
osity; there was neither retaliation, annexation, mortgage, 
nor irredentism. Brazil had found in Mitre, president of 
Argentina, and Flores, president of Uruguay, two helpful 
allies, who, acting in close cooperation, proved that  the 
Brazilian attitude was the expression of continental political 
agreement. 
The last phase of our imperial life was a period of twenty 
years of peace and prosperity. Dom Pedro I1 had promised 
tha t  so long as he should live, no new war would ever drive 
him into conflict. The venerable old monarch upheld con- 
ciliation, accommodation, and arbitration as the best ways 
t o  settle international difficulties. 
It was under his influence tha t  our “imperial system” sub- 
mitted t o  the President of the United States the boundary 
discussion we still had in 1889 with the Argentine Republic- 
the so-called Mission Territory question, that  was settled 
later according t o  our claims. 
111. PHASES OF REPUBLICAN DIPLOMACY 
When republican government was established, in Novem- 
ber, 1889, the recognition of the new order by foreign powers 
was by no means an easy task. 
I n  America, I admit, the Spanish-speaking countries 
greeted the new regime with cordiality and sympathy. They 
were eager t o  see Brazil complete the list of American 
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republics. The Argentine statesman Alberti had written in 
his Ersayr: “The existence of a monarchical power in Brazil 
does not suit American Republics.” Another Argentine, 
Juan Carlos Gbmez, had written to  General Mitre: “I love 
the Brazilian people, but I hate the Brazilian Monarchy.” 
Indeed, Argentina and Uruguay promptly recognized the 
new republic on November 20, 1889, five days after the 
proclamation; and in turn recognition was accorded by Chile 
on December 13 ; on January 3,7,  13, and 29, respectively, by 
Bolivia, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States; on 
February 6 by Guatemala and El Salvador, and on Febru- 
ary 20 by Colombia, while in March Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
and Honduras followed suit. 
In  Europe there was at  the beginning a sort of lack of 
confidence in the provisional government that had over- 
thrown the empire. There was also a significant expectant 
attitude of most monarchical governments in relation to  
what republican France would do. The negotiations in Paris 
were rather delayed and our agent, Baron de Itajub5, had 
some difficulties with Monsieur Ribot on account of a decree 
on naturalization issued by the Brazilian government on 
December 14, 1889, involving foreign residents in the coun- 
try, and also on account of boundary disputes in Guiana. 
Only in June, 1890, was the French cabinet satisfied with our 
explanation and willing to  recognize the new political form of 
govern men t . 
In Germany, Bismarck had a rather curious way of solving 
the question: his attitude in Berlin, not even receiving offi- 
cially our envoy, differed totally from his attitude in Rio de 
Janeiro, where his envoy was instructed to carry on relations 
with the new Brazilian government. 
In London, Salisbury admitted unofficially the Brazilian 
minister, but waited until the republican constitution had 
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(6 been promulgated to  invite him to  the Queen’s drawing 
room.” 
On the other hand, Portugal, Italy, and Spain were un- 
willing t o  take definite action before hearing from France, 
whether, in the light of that  country’s experience with revo- 
lutions, ours was of a trustworthy type. 
In  Belgium recognition was unexpectedly involved in 
claims of Gaz Company shareholders. 
Russia, bound by tradition, only recognized the Brazilian 
Republic in May, 1892, after the death of Emperor Pedro 11. 
At last, in the United States, discussions in Congress on 
Brazilian affairs proceeded as a sequence to  the debates on 
President Harrison’s message of December 2 ,  1889, in which 
immediate recognition was recommended. 
Senator Morgan, Democrat, of Alabama, made a motion 
in support of the recommendation, referring in particular to 
the personality of the emperor, his visit t o  the United States, 
his liberalism, and rare qualities. He thought that  any hesi- 
tation by the United States might have encouraged Euro- 
pean monarchical interference in South America to  restore 
the old regime, impair autonomy in our continent, and thus 
bring us under the operation of the Monroe Doctrine. The 
Republican senators were not so eager t o  act and wanted 
more information on recent Brazilian political events. 
Finally the motion was sent t o  the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and recognition followed in February, 1890. 
Early in our republican life, and after two unimportant 
diplomatic incidents, one with Portugal and the other with 
Great Britain, there appeared on the Brazilian political stage 
the remarkable personality of J. M. da Silva Paranhos, 
known as the Baron of Rio Branco, or simply “the Baron.’’ 
He was the son of the Viscount of Rio Branco, a statesman 
of the imperial regime. Born in 1845, he studied law in Sao 
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Paulo and Recife, followed his father in a mission t o  the 
River Plate and Paraguay, and was elected deputy in 1869 
by the Conservative Party. He soon entered journalism and 
stood for the freedom of the slaves. 
His diplomatic career started in 1876 when appointed to  
Liverpool as consul-general. He spent long years in Europe, 
studying almost exclusively Brazilian affairs, history, poli- 
tics, and geography, in European archives and libraries. 
Therefore it was not by accident that  the republican 
government chose Rio Branco, though not a republican him- 
self, but evidently the best-equipped specialist t o  defend 
Brazilian interests in Washington, where our territorial dis- 
pute with Argentina, about the Mission Territory between 
the Uruguay River and the Iguassii River, had been sub- 
mitted t o  the President of the United States for arbitration. 
I n  February, I 895, President Cleveland’s decision acknowl- 
edged Brazilian rights: it was a victory of justice and of 
learning as well. The “Brazilian Memoir” of Rio Branco 
was a masterpiece. 
It was only natural that  after such a success another 
similar mission should be entrusted to  the Baron. It was the 
territorial question of the Guiana, a controversy with France 
that went as far back as the Treaty of Utrecht. The question 
was submitted t o  the arbitration of the Swiss Federal Coun- 
cil. Another “Brazilian Memoir” of 840 pages was produced 
in Berne by Rio Branco and, in 1900, another diplomatic 
victory of the same kind was achieved by Brazil. 
When Councillor Rodrigues Alves was elected president of 
the republic for the term 1902-1906, he invited the Baron t o  
be his Foreign Secretary. Rio Branco came back t o  his 
country, reorganized the Chancery, centralizing in his office 
a well-informed “Intelligence Service” in close contact with 
all American diplomatic moves. And for ten years, until his 
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untimely death in 1912, he was the Brazilian Chancellor, the 
most popular man in the country, with moral authority and 
political prestige. 
These ten years might be described as the Golden Era of 
Brazilian diplomacy. 
The extensive frontier t ha t  both colonial and imperial 
regimes had bequeathed t o  the republic was in great part 
unsettled and uncertain. It was one of Rio Branco’s chief 
purposes t o  have i t  settled by international agreements. One 
of Brazil’s most prominent personalities, the historian and 
diplomatist Joaquim Nabuco, helped t o  solve another Bra- 
zilian frontier dispute by arbitration of the King of Italy, 
who in June, 1904, awarded most of the area in dispute t o  
British Guiana. Later on Joaquim Nabuco was sent t o  
Washington as our first Ambassador. 
Out of 16,300 kilometers of continental frontiers, 14,000 
kilometers were settled by Rio Branco, while in office; and 
the territory awarded to  Brazil by his negotiations amounts 
t o  almost 450,000 square kilometers. 
By far the greatest diplomatic stroke was the Brazilian 
achievement in the well-known Acre Territory, where a 
Brazilian community of settlers in the Upper Amazonian 
jungle had set up a sort of independent state in open conflict 
with Bolivian authorities and the newly incorporated Bo- 
livian Syndicate. Rio Branco’s intervention caused an expe- 
ditionary corps t o  be sent t o  prevent hostilities between 
Bolivian troops and the Acreans. Peace was successfully 
maintained, and a few months later the Treaty of Petropolis 
was signed between Brazil and Bolivia, November, 1903. 
We purchased the territory for two million pounds. A 
boundary adjustment was established, and we promised t o  
build a 300-kilometer railway along the Madeira and Ma- 
mor6 rivers t o  afford an outlet for India rubber exports of all 
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the Brazilian-Bolivian Amazonian tributaries. Almost I 50,- 
000 square kilometers were thus peacefully annexed to  Bra- 
zilian territory. Besides being good business it was an 
effective application of our traditional policy of uti possidetir. 
In  three years, production of India rubber paid for the 
purchase. 
Many more adjustments were negotiated by the Baron t o  
settle our frontier questions with Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Dutch Guiana, and a boundary treaty was signed also with 
Peru for the western part of the Acre Territory, in 1909. In 
conformity with the spirit of the first republican constitu- 
tion, no fewer than thirty arbitration treaties were ratified 
with all the nations. 
Many other events of diplomatic significance were brought 
about by Rio Branco: the first cardinal for South America 
was appointed by Rome; the first South American Embassy 
in Washington was accepted; the Third Pan American Con- 
gress was summoned in Rio de Janeiro, in 1906, with a visit 
of Secretary Elihu Root; Brazil was represented by Ruy 
Barbosa at  the Second Hague Conference in 1907. 
All these facts show a growing international interest in 
Brazil as the result of intelligent and efficient political action 
of which Rio Branco was the promoter. 
Of course such activity would arouse opposition in some 
quarters. Brazilian diplomacy was denounced as imperial- 
istic by an Argentine statesman and journalist, Zeballos. In 
1908 the famous Dispatch No. 9 was distorted by the press 
as meaning evil intentions of the Brazilian government in the 
River Plate. The  Baron did not hesitate to  publish the 
cipher, and the true tenor of the dispatch was revealed as the 
most peaceful and conciliatory instructions that a govern- 
ment could send. 
Rio Branco’s sentiments toward Argentina are expressed 
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in a private letter t o  the Argentine minister, Gorostiaga, in 
1905: “I spent my youth,” he wrote, “during the effective 
alliance of Brazil and Argentina. I am the son of a man who 
always was a sincere friend of the Argentine nation as he 
often proved in his political career. I wish that  it might be 
said some day that during my term of office I did everything 
t o  dissipate misunderstandings and tighten relations of har- 
mony between the two nations. Every day I am more con- 
vinced that a cordial understanding between Argentina, Bra- 
zil, and Chile would be of the greatest advantage t o  all three 
of them and would benefit others, beyond their frontiers.” 
Toward the United States Rio Branco’s feelings might be 
gauged by the last lines of an article under the pseudonym, 
J. Penn, written by him when foreign secretary. “All the 
maneuvers against us tried in Washington, since 1823 up t o  
now, have always failed against the unconquerable barrier of 
traditional friendliness that happily links Brazil t o  the 
United States, and it is the duty of the present generation 
t o  foster it with the same spirit and eagerness as our fore- 
fathers.” These words are truly the most telling advice on 
foreign policy that  has been bequeathed to  Brazil by the 
Great Chancellor. 
Not long after Rio Branco’s death the world crisis dragged 
civilized nations into the Great War. Brazil kept neutral as 
long as possible, but not without a marked sympathy toward 
the Allies, chiefly under the influence of a prominent states- 
man, Ruy Barbosa, who could not remain an “indifferent 
spectator,” as he said, in the world tragedy. After the unre- 
stricted submarine warfare began in 1917, the country 
changed its attitude and severed diplomatic relations with 
Germany as the United States entered the conflict. In  
October of the same year the sinking of Brazilian ships 
determined the congress to  join the Allies. Brazil sided with 
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those whose position was, at  the time, most critical and less 
promising. It was a severe drawback to her economic life, 
but it had, at  least, one happy result: it drew our attention 
to  the necessity of intensifying our relations with the United 
States and, consequently, t o  the leading of a decidedly Ameri- 
can life. We realized at  last in a practical way what Elihu Root 
had said in 1907: our national resources are complementary 
and so are our respective populations, their activities, and 
their mentalities. These facts had considerable bearing hence- 
forth on our foreign policy. 
After peace was restored Brazil joined the League of 
Nations and was able t o  secure one of the four non-perma- 
nent seats in the Council. She played her part in the pacific 
settlement of disputes, namely, in the Aaland Islands case 
between Sweden and Finland in 1921. For six years Brazil 
held her seat in a state of semi-permanence, but in 1926 when 
the entry of Germany was decided upon, and the Concert of 
Great Powers seemed willing to  drop old friends for new, the 
Brazilian government thought it advisable to  give notice of 
their resignation. The withdrawal of Brazil from the League 
did not involve her indifference to the non-political activities 
of the World Court and the Labor Bureau. The League of 
Nations episode, in the diplomatic life of the country, em- 
phasized to  us the fact that  Pan Americanism is, for the time 
being, the only practical form of internationalism. 
It is necessary to  recognize that the Council, as consti- 
tuted,” says Gathorne-Hardy, “was definitely a compromise 
between the democratic theory of the League and the prac- 
tical survival of a Concert of Great Powers, without whose 
approval the new order could not be expected to  work. . . . 
a class distinction in the international hierarchy was implicit 
in the arrangement.”’ 
6 6  
*G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, Short HiJtory of International Afuirs, 1920-34 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1934)~ p. 190. 
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The  failure of the League of Nations in America became 
apparent in 1933 when four non-American representatives, 
Spain, Great Britain, France, and Italy, besides Mexico, 
were appointed t o  adjust the Chaco quarrel in South Amer- 
ica. Both belligerents, Paraguayans and Bolivians alike, 
announced that they preferred Americans. A mediatory 
group consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, the 
United States, and Uruguay succeeded in a few months in 
bringing about negotiations for peace-a protocol was signed 
in June, 1935. Once more Brazilian diplomacy was called t o  
join in with her sister republics. 
IV. BRAZIL A N D  P A N  AMERICANISM 
It appears that  the Monroe Doctrine has two meanings: 
a general one on which everybody seems t o  agree, because 
everybody sees in it the same thing, let us say, an almost 
exclusive interest in American territories and activities; and 
an individual view, tha t  has not yet commanded unanimous 
approval, in which every single person or group of persons 
finds a different thing, according t o  an optimistic or a pessi- 
mistic view of human affairs. Thus in addition t o  a perma- 
nent element, the Monroe Doctrine has expedient and 
pragmatic elements that  vary according to  opportunities. 
The  first point of view, the only one that  interests us, as a 
lasting interpretation, shows a closer connection with what 
we call Pan Americanism. “We are Americans and nothing 
could ever find us indifferent.” 
The Monroe Doctrine is an international principle, maybe, 
but i t  is far more an attitude of the American mind. It is my 
purpose t o  examine, as far as Brazil is concerned, what our 
reactions have been in connection with it. 
First of all: Brazil had a Monroe Doctrine before President 
Monroe had delivered his well-known message of 1823. We 
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were still a Portuguese colony, a kingdom, when our regent, 
Prince Pedro of Braganqa, sent to  the United States of 
America and to  Buenos Aires consular representatives that 
were, in fact, secret agents of his political plans for inde- 
pendence. To Correa da Camara, our agent in Buenos Aires, 
Jos6 Bonifacio gave confidential instructions which run as 
follows:1 “You shall show that  a recolonization of Brazil is 
an impossibility.” This was written on May 30, 1822, ninety 
days before our independence was declared.2 These confi- 
dential instructions say further: 
Yet, if i t  were believable tha t  Brazil would fall to  pieces owing t o  in- 
ternal divisions, the example would prove fatal t o  America and her other 
States would repent in vain not having helped us; but, as soon as Unity 
and Independence are consolidated, Europe shall a t  once lose all hope of 
restoring her domination in her former colonies. After having skillfully 
persuaded (the Buenos Aires government) t ha t  the interests of this King- 
dom are the same as those of the other States of this Hemisphere, and 
demonstrated the destinies they share with us, your Lordship shall promise 
on behalf of his Royal Highness the solemn acknowledgement of their po- 
litical independence, and shall explain the invaluable benefits t ha t  would 
result from a Confederation or an offensive and defensive Treaty with 
Brazil, in order to  oppose, with all Spanish American Governments, the 
astute plots of European policy. 
Brazil was ripe for hearing and understanding President 
Monroe’s advice. A few days later, on June IO, more in- 
structions were sent to  our secret agent by our Foreign 
Office: “I may inform your Lordship that  His Royal High- 
ness does not wish to  adopt a system that  would not prove 
to  be American, for He is convinced that the interests of all 
American Governments, whatever they are, must all be con- 
sidered as homogeneous, resulting from the same principle : 
a just and firm repulse of the arrogant claims of Europe.” 
‘Annals of Itamaraty,  Vol. 11, p. 234. 
*President Monroe recognized our Independence in 1824. “At the cabinet 
meeting when the question was brought up, Mr .  Wirt  opposed recognition on the 
ground tha t  the  government was monarchical and not republican; but both Calhoun 
and A d a m  favored recognition on the basis of independence alone, leaving aside 
all consideration of internal government”-Graham H. Stuart ,  09. d., p. 421. 
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Early in 1824, Jos6 Sylvestre Rebello was appointed first 
diplomatic representative to  the United States. About two 
months after Monroe’s message enunciating the Monroe 
Doctrine, the imperial government had sent Rebello the 
following instructions : “The principles expressed in the 
President’s message of December to  both Houses have a 
more general application t o  all the States of this Continent, 
as the message announces clearly the necessity of uniting 
ourselves to  struggle for the defense of our rights and terri- 
tories, Your Lordship shall feel the dispositions of the 
United States Government towards an offensive and de- 
fensive alliance with this Empire, as a part of the American 
Continent; provided such an alliance have no reciprocal con- 
cessions as a base, but only the principle of mutual con- 
venience thereof resulting.” Rebello suggested a concert of 
American powers to  sustain the general system of American 
independence and proposed a definite alliance. 
“Monroe,” says Graham Stuart, “declined the proposal in 
private t o  Adams; but no official reply was made until 
Adams became President, when Clay declared that the pros- 
pect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil seemed 
to  make such an alliance unnecessary.”l 
In  1825, an incident brought about strained relations be- 
tween Brazil and the United States. Condy Raguet, the 
American chargE, protested against the Brazilian blockade of 
Buenos Aires, and a crisis was reached when the American 
vessel, the Spark, was seized in 1827 by a Brazilian warship, 
as suspected of being a privateer. Unsatisfied with the 
Brazilian explanations, Raguet “the next day asked for his 
passports and the Emperor, although ‘surprised at this pre- 
cipitate request couched in abrupt and vague language’ 
ordered them to  be delivered, but with the notice that the 
lop. cit., p. 421. 
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American representative would be answerable to  his govern- 
ment for the consequences which might result. Before the 
break in diplomatic relations came, both Clay and Adams 
became convinced that Mr. Raguet’s language and conduct 
were not so reserved as they should have been, and in a note 
dated January 20, 1827, Clay wrote Raguet that  the Presi- 
dent would have been better satisfied if he had abstained 
from some of the language employed.”’ 
The interruption of diplomatic relations in Rio did not 
extend t o  Washington, for Clay, being assured by Rebello 
that reparations would be forthcoming, named as chargii at 
Rio, William Tudor, a merchant at Lima. The appointment 
proved excellent. Tudor was a man of tact and good judg- 
ment. He placed the relations between the two nations upon 
a firm basis of friendly understanding. He concluded a 
Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, incorporating the 
most-favored nation clause and settlement of the blockade 
question. 
It would take too long to  quote all the episodes of a century 
of friendly relations, in which the words “American in- 
terests,” “friendship,” “understanding,” and even “alliance” 
have frequently been repeated as expressing attitudes and 
purposes held in common. It would be sufficient t o  quote the 
words of some of our most prominent statesmen like Rio 
Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and others. 
In  1910, a t  the Fourth Pan American Conference in 
Buenos Aires, the Brazilian minister at  Buenos Aires, Dr. 
Domicio da Gama, explained to  members of the Chilean 
delegation the wish of the late Ambassador Nabuco to  
present t o  the Conference a motion which “would evidence 
the recognition by all the countries of America of the fact 
lop. cit., p. 423; Stuart gives as his authority House Ex. Doc. No. 281, 20th 
Cong. 1st sess., pp. 104-108. 
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that  the Monroe Doctrine had been beneficial t o  them.” It 
was a formal declaration the Government of Brazil desired 
to  present without any change, out of respect t o  the memory 
of the Ambassador, “recognizing i t  as a permanent factor 
making for international peace upon the American Con- 
tinent.” Alexandre Alvarez proposed a rather different reso- 
lution, “a factor contributing towards guaranteeing the 
sovereignty of the Nations of this Continent.” It was sub- 
mitted to  the members of the Argentine delegation. Some 
delegates thought that  the approval of the motion would be 
sanction of “many acts of hegemony committed by the 
United States by which more than one country had felt its 
sovereign dignity to  have been wounded.” Therefore the 
delegation of the United States, though admitting the right 
of Latin America t o  make the Monroe Doctrine hers, feared 
the discussion would create dissensions in the assembly, and 
thought it preferable t o  make no presentation at  all. Brazil 
realized that  unanimous assent was difficult t o  obtain. Any- 
way the incident helped to  make clear: ( I )  that  the Monroe 
Doctrine was in accord with the New World diplomatic aims 
and was part of its public law; (2) that  the Chilean govern- 
ment was willing to  join in the resolution; (3)  that  the word- 
ing was difficult t o  find without exciting European suscepti- 
bilities, and some states wanted restrictions as t o  the United 
States hegemony; (4) that  Brazil had not received a diplo- 
matic rebuff; ( 5 )  that  the Monroe Doctrine was not disa- 
vowed by the Conference, since the question was not one of 
public law proclaimed, but of simply a historical fact recog- 
nized as having dominated the political life of the New 
World. 
In  I923 the Centennial of the Monroe Doctrine was cele- 
brated on December 2 in our Foreign Office, and Chancellor 
Felix Pacheco in his speech mentioned the diverse interpre- 
332 Lectures on Brazilian Affairs 
tations of that  Doctrine, but added: “It is not my business to  
say anything about these interpretations. As Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of my country, my duty is t o  affirm, once 
more, our gratitude to, and besides that gratitude, our close 
solidarity with the United States of America in supporting 
that line of action in which the idea of mutual help and 
assistance the American nations owe t o  one another is a 
capital element.” 
Chancellor Pacheco’s conviction was that the Doctrine had 
worked long enough to  prove that it was a permanent factor 
of peace on the American continent. 
The Chilean internationalist, Alexandre Alvarez, has abun- 
dantly proved that the political and economic history of the 
New World has provided all the elements for an American 
international law. 
As European international law, resulting from Christian 
civilization and occidental culture, seemed to  be universal, 
it would be difficult for Europeans to admit the existence of 
an Asiatic or of an African international law, yet there are 
such laws and their existence in no way destroys the universal 
community of nations. 
The American international law ignores such questions as 
influence zone,” “protectorate,” “neutral states,” “per- 
sonal union,” etc. On the other hand, “federation,” “na- 
tionality,” “international rivers and canals” have different 
meanings in America, and many more problems of interna- 
tional cooperation and support have among us a broader 
field. Our fifty years’ experience of Pan American Con- 
ferences has emphasized many new aspects of inter-American 
relations, many more than Secretary Blaine ever dreamed of 
when he invited us t o  Washington in 1889. 
A long way has been travelled since: the third Conference 
was summoned in 1906 in Rio de Janeiro, and the last one, 
( I .  
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the eighth, was summoned in Lima in 1938. Brazil has faith- 
fully attended all these meetings, besides many others, and 
has sent her representatives t o  Europe, t o  the Hague Peace 
Conference in 1907, and t o  the Versailles Peace Settlement, 
after the first Great War, but always the same principles 
have guided her attitude, and those principles were typically 
Pan American. 
T o  European diplomatists it was almost scandalous for the 
Brazilian delegate, Ruy Barbosa, t o  talk in I907 of com- 
pulsory arbitration, t o  propose equality of all nations in the 
Permanent Court of Justice, and to  suggest the non-recogni- 
tion of acquisitions by war or by threat-an interpretation 
that later on was to  be known as the “Stimson Doctrine,” 
in 1932. As one of our prominent internationalists, Dr. R a d  
Fernandes, defined us in 1928, “Brazil, from an international 
point of view, is synonymous with Arbitration.” 
These were truly American ideals that  could only have 
grown in Pan American hot-beds, and it might be inferred 
that  in extra-American meetings Brazil has always repre- 
sented the tradition of America. 
Lately our President, Dr. Getulio Vargas, said, “Extend- 
ing to  the field of economic cooperation our relations of good 
neighborliness with a marked character of continental soli- 
darity, our Country shows how ideals of American fraternal- 
ization may be attained.” 
V. T H E  C O M M U N I T Y  OF N A T I O N S  
Brazil has always maintained friendly feelings towards her 
sister republics of the continent. A traditional friendship has 
long existed between Brazil and Chile; with the Argentine 
also there are cordial memories of alliances in the past, for 
example, against Rosas and in the Paraguayan U7ar; nor did 
Rio Branco’s victory in the Mission Territory arbitration 
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blur any of them substantially. In  1899, General Julio Roca 
visited Brazil, and the next year President Campos Salles 
returned the visit. An Argentine president, Roque Saenz 
Pena, had already declared to Brazil : “Everything unites us, 
nothing divides us.” 
When, in the beginning of 1914, the Tampico incident and 
the Vera Cruz landing nearly resulted in a Mexican War, 
the so-called A.B.C. powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 
did not hesitate t o  instruct their ambassadors in Washington 
to  meet President Wilson in conference and offer their 
friendly intervention. It was accepted and the Niagara Falls 
meeting smoothed the whole situation. 
After the World War had started, the A.B.C. powers 
thought that  perhaps their cooperation in America would 
prove useful. A treaty was signed in Buenos Aires on May 
~ j ,  1915, the Argentine Independence Day, t o  “make easy 
the pacific solution of international controversies.” The 
A.B.C. initiative, however, was not always well interpreted : 
Peru and Bolivia, still sore over the Tacna and Arica ques- 
tion with Chile, tried a “Bolivarian league” to  oppose the 
possible hegemony which the A.B.C. might t ry  to establish 
in South America. 
The A.B.C. Treaty, however, was never ratified by Argen- 
tina, yet in 1932 the A.B.C. made a worthy attempt t o  settle 
the Leticia controversy between Peru and Colombia. I n  
short, the A.B.C. entente never worked as such, not because 
of any idea of domination, but because the remainder of the 
alphabet was missing, and the true Pan American spirit 
requires both totality and equality among American nations. 
The A.B.C. group has proved itself useful in international 
relations, and might still be of some help in the future, but 
merely as an occasional American group that agrees on some 
special question, and not as an international entity with a 
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permanent committee, as was planned in 1915. Brazil and 
the Argentine are the best friends in the world, they are 
economically complementary, and are not competitors, but 
their leanings are diverse: Argentina is far more European in 
her sympathies, interests, and politics. 
It would not be fair t o  say that  Brazil has kept away from 
powerful European influences. Our civilization was born of 
European cultural complexes, and we do not intend to  sever 
our ties with Europe. 
But these ties are of different kinds. With practically all 
nations of the Old World we have important commercial 
relations : they are the basis of diplomatic connections with 
the European powers. Since the early years of our inde- 
pendence, commercial and navigation treaties have been 
signed with the different countries; they were denounced in 
the twentieth century and new understandings were drawn. 
For the time being, we have provisional commercial agree- 
ments, passed in 1936, with most European countries. 
Another line of special interests concerns the nations that 
send us an annual flow of immigrants. We are therefore in 
more intimate diplomatic contact with Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, and Germany, as well as Japan, in Asia. 
The pre-eminence of England in our foreign relations dur- 
ing more than a century was due in part t o  the financial 
dependence of Brazil. With Germany there has been scien- 
tific contact; from Italy a great deal of Latin culture has 
come through artistic channels. Portugal, in former times, 
revealed Asia, and chiefly India, t o  the Brazilians. 
But the greatest cultural influence, through literature, art, 
political life, fashions, and social customs has been that  of 
France. And of course such a powerful contact, though 
slightly in decline, owing to  competition of other cultures, is 
bound to  create political sympathies that even opposite eco- 
nomic interests are not able to  abate or even t o  check. 
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A Brazilian diplomatist, Helio Lobo, has recently written 
about our position in America: “With the United States, we 
were in America a variant of language and customs, besides 
other factors t ha t  segregated us also.” Was that the origin 
of our friendship? Did that friendship always exist? The 
fact deserves investigation, as the interest of the American 
reader in Brazil seems t o  have increased lately, for several 
books refer t o  the diplomatic relations of the two countries. 
It is possible that  when official correspondence, reports, 
and private archives of the two nations have been searched 
and studied, different phases of these relations will appear 
under a new light. 
The first phase began when we became independent of 
Portugal and tried to  interest the government in Washington 
in our affairs, for example, through the missions of G.da 
Cruz and Sylvestre Rebello. It was a period of mutual 
sympathy without cooperation. 
The second phase, although it involves the Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation of 1828, was marked by the 
missions to Rio de Janeiro of Raguet, of Henry Wise, and 
General Watson Webb. Incidents were multiplied; perhaps 
some blunders were made: we recognized Maximilian, we in- 
sisted on being neutrals in the Civil War, we saw our attitude 
in the River Plate ill interpreted. I would call that  the 
period of mutual distrust, which lasted until Watson Webb 
was recalled in 1869. 
The third period is a period of calm and soothing effect. 
The Brazilian republican evolution makes us more alike; we 
are no more suspected-recovered sympathy is joined by 
interest in the Commercial Agreement of 1891-sympathy 
and interest might be its title. 
The fourth period starts in 1902, when the Great Chan- 
cellor came into office. I t  is the phase of Rio Branco, Elihu 
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Root, Joaquim Nabuco, in Pan American Congresses. There 
is more than interest: it is the period of good will and co- 
operation. 
The fifth phase starts with the joining in the Great War 
and the after-war developments. It spells even more than 
cooperation; it is mutual understanding and help. Tha t  is 
still the situation we are trying t o  improve, if possible. 
“The fact,’’ says Normano, “ that  Brazil’s attitude toward 
the United States is more friendly than that  of any Spanish 
American country, has been noted by many writers of the 
United States,” and he quotes Bingham, Clarence Haring, 
Percy Martin, and others. If the spirit of a truly political 
alliance is already in the air, what shall the next phase be 
called, I wonder? 
CARLOS DELGADO DE CARVALHO. 



